State Regulation of Tender Offers for Insurance Companies After Edgar v. Mite by Webster, Susan
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 51 Issue 5 Article 7 
1983 
State Regulation of Tender Offers for Insurance Companies After 
Edgar v. Mite 
Susan Webster 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Susan Webster, State Regulation of Tender Offers for Insurance Companies After Edgar v. Mite, 51 
Fordham L. Rev. 943 (1983). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol51/iss5/7 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
STATE REGULATION OF TENDER OFFERS FOR
INSURANCE COMPANIES AFTER EDGAR V. MITE
INTRODUCTION
In the 1960's, tender offers' became increasingly popular as mecha-
nisms for acquiring corporate control.2 Before the Williams Act was
passed in 1968, 3 the use of tender offers had been virtually unregu-
lated.4 The Williams Act sought to fill this gap by giving investors the
time and information needed to make an informed investment deci-
sion. 5 Desire for additional protections led to the enactment of general
state legislation regulating tender offers." In addition, most states have
1. A tender offer has been defined as:
A public offer or solicitation by a company, an individual or a group of
persons [offeror] to purchase during a fixed period of time all or a portion of
a class or classes of securities of a publicly held corporation [target] at a
specified price or upon specified terms for cash and/or securities.
E. Aranow & H. Einhorn, Tender Offers for Corporate Control 70 (1973); see
Einhorn & Blackburn, The Developing Concept of "Tender Offer": An Analysis of
the Judicial and Administrative Interpretations of the Term, 23 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev.
379 (1978); Note, The Developing Aleaning of "Tender Offer" under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1250 (1973). The terms "tender offer" and
"takeover bid" are synonymous and are used interchangeably in this Note.
2. H.R. Rep. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 [hereinafter cited as House
Report], reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2811, 2811-12. The number
of acquisitions by tender offer rose from eight in 1960 to over 100 in 1966. Id. at 2,
reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2812; see Note, Commerce Clause
Limitations upon State Regulation of Tender Offers, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1133, 1136
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Commerce Clause Limitations]. The tender offer was
considered superior to stock transfers and proxy contests for acquiring control of a
corporation. Unlike stock transfers, tender offers did not have to be registered with
the SEC. Moreover, the chances of a successful acquisition were much higher by use
of a tender offer than in a proxy contest controlled by target management. Increased
liquidity of the acquiring companies, increased availability of credit to finance
acquisitions, and a desire to expand through merger and acquisition contributed to
the increased use of tender offers. Id. at 1138-39.
3. Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)); see 6 L.
Loss, Securities Regulation 3658 (2d ed. Supp. 1969). See infra notes 28-44 and
accompanying text.
4. See House Report, supra note 2, at 2-3, reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 2812. Disclosure of the offeror's identity, associates or the source of his
funds was not required. Id. The offeror could thus operate with speed and anonym-
ity, thereby circumventing incumbent management without being subject to the
federal securities laws governing other forms of acquisition of control.
5. House Report, supra note 2, at 3-4, reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 2812-13; S. Rep. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Senate Report].
6. For a listing of states that have enacted general state takeover legislation, see
Sargent, On the Validity of State Takeover Regulation: State Responses to MITE and
Kidwell, 42 Ohio St. L.J. 689, 690 n.7 (1981). See infra note 55.
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adopted legislation based on a Model Act,7 formulated in 1969 by the
insurance industry, designed to regulate tender offers for insurance
companies. s State takeover legislation has been challenged on the
7. Insurance Holding Company System Regulatory Act, 2 Official N.A.I.C.
Model Insurance Laws Regulations and Guidelines 440-1 (N.A.I.C. 1980) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Model Act].
8. Forty-two states have adopted statutes regulating the acquisition of control of
a domestic insurer. Ala. Code §§ 27-29-3, -8 to -10, -13 (1975); Alaska Stat. §§
21.22.010-.050, .130-.170 (Supp. 1982); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 20-481.02-.08,
.22-.23 (1975 & Supp. 1982-1983); Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 66-5005, -5010 to -5013
(1980); Cal. Ins. Code §§ 1215.2-.3, .8-.10 (West 1972 & Supp. 1982); Colo. Rev.
Stat. §§ 10-3-803, -808 to -810, -813 (1973 & Supp. 1982); Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 38-
39b to -39f, -39j to -391 (1981); Del. Code Ann. tit. 18, § 4932 (1974); Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 628.461 (West Supp. 1983); Ca. Code Ann. §§ 33-13-3, -8 to -10, -14 to -15 (1982);
Idaho Code 99 41-3802 to -3805A, -3812 to -3813, -3815 (1977 & Supp. 1982);
Insurance Holding Company Systems §§ 131.4-.12, .23-.24, .27, Ill. Ann. Stat. ch.
73, §§ 743.4-.12, .23-.24, .27 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-1983); Ind. Code Ann. §§
27-1-23-2, -7 to -8, -12 (Burns Supp. 1982); Iowa Code Ann. §§ 521A.3, .8-.10, .13
(West Supp. 1982-1983); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 40-3304, -3309 to -3310, -3312 (1981);
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 304.24-410 (Bobbs-Merrill 1981); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 24-
A, § 222(4)-(7), (14), (17)-(18) (Supp. 1982-1983); Md. Ann. Code art. 48A, §§ 494,
500 (1979 & Supp. 1982); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 175, § 193M (Michie/Law. Co-op.
1977); Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 60D.02, .07-.09, .12 (West Supp. 1983); Mo. Ann. Stat.
§§ 382.040-.090, .240-.270, .300 (Vernon Supp. 1983); Mont. Code Ann. §§ 33-2-
1104 to -1106, -1117 to -1120, -1123 (1981); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 44-2105 to -2108,
-2115, -2117 (1978); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 692C.180-.250, .430-.450, .480-.490 (1979);
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 401-B:3, :8-:10, :14 (Supp. 1979); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§
17:27A-2, -7 to -9, -12 (West Supp. 1982-1983); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 59-7-5 to -12, -28
to -30, -33 (1978); N.Y. Ins. Law §§ 69-f, -j (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983); N.D.
Cent. Code §§ 26-21.2-03, -08 to -10, -13 (Supp. 1981); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 36, §§
1653, 1658-1659 (West 1976 & Supp. 1982-1983); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 40, § 459.6
(Purdon 1971 & Supp. 1982-1983); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 27-35-2, -7 to -9, -12 (1979);
S.C. Code Ann. §§ 38-29-60 to -130, -310, -330, -360 (Law. Co-op. 1977); S.D.
Codified Laws Ann. §§ 58-5A-3 to -19 (1978); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 56-10-202 to -207
(1980); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 21.49-1 §§ 5, 11-13, 17 (Vernon 1981); Utah
Code Ann. §§ 31-39-2, -7 to -9, -12 (1974 & Supp. 1981); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 8, §§
3683, 3688-3690, 3693 (Supp. 1982); Va. Code §§ 38.1-178.1:1 to :7, 38.1-178.6-.8
(1981); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 48.31A.020-.050, .120-.130 (Supp. 1982); W. Va.
Code §§ 33-27-3, -8 to -9 (1982); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 617.12 (West 1980). The Model
Act also regulates insurance holding company systems, which are defined as "two or
more affiliated persons, one or more of which is an insurer." Model Act, supra note 7,
§ 1(d), at 440-1. The Act requires registration of insurance holding company systems
with the state insurance commissioner and establishes standards for their transactions
with affiliates, adequacy of surplus, and dividends and other distributions. Id. §§ 4,
5, at 440-12 to 440-15.
Initially, tender offers for securities of insurance companies were not regulated by
the Williams Act. See Wilder, Regulation of the Insurance Industry Under the
Proposed Federal Securities Code, 7 Conn. L. Rev. 711, 718 (1975). In 1970, how-
ever, the Act was amended to extend its coverage to tender offers for insurance
companies. Act of Dec. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, 84 Stat. 1497 (1970).
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grounds that it violates the commerce clause9 and is preempted by the
Williams Act.' 0 The lower courts' decisions have yielded conflicting
results.'I
In 1982, in Edgar v. MITE Corp.,' 2 the Supreme Court held that a
general takeover statute was unconstitutional as an excessive burden
on interstate commerce. 3 The Court was divided on the preemption
issue.14
9. E.g., Hi-Shear Indus. v. Campbell, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 97,804, at 90,032-34 (D.S.C. Dec. 4, 1980); AMCA Int'l Corp. v. Krouse,
482 F. Supp. 929, 938-41 (S.D. Ohio 1979); Dart Indus. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. 1,
13-14 (S.D. Ind. 1978).
10. E.g., Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 507 F. Supp. 1206, 1222-24 (D.N.J. 1981);
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Marley, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 98,246, at 91,618-21 (W.D. Okla. July 17, 1981); Sharon Steel Corp. v.
Whaland, 121 N.H. 607, 613-17, 433 A.2d 1250, 1253-56 (1981), vacated and
remanded sub nom. Sharon Steel Corp. v. Insurance Comm'r, 102 S. Ct. 3474
(1982).
11. Compare Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1279, 1286 (5th
Cir. 1978) (Idaho general takeover statute violates commerce clause and is pre-
empted), rev'd on other grounds sub noma. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S.
173 (1979) and Empire, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 524 F. Supp. 898, 903-06 (W.D. Mo. 1981)
(Missouri general takeover statute violates commerce clause and is preempted) with
AMCA Int'l Corp. v. Krouse, 482 F. Supp. 929, 938, 941 (S.D. Ohio 1979) (Ohio
general takeover statute upheld) and City Investing Co. v. Simcox, 476 F. Supp. 112,
116 (S.D. Ind. 1979) (Indiana general takeover statute upheld), aff'd, 633 F.2d 56
(7th Cir. 1980). Commentators have also reached different conclusions about the
constitutionality of state takeover legislation. Compare Wilner & Landy, The Tender
Trap: State Takeover Statutes and Their Constitutionality, 45 Fordham L. Rev. 1,
23, 31 (1976) (statutes are unconstitutional) and Commerce Clause Limitations,
supra note 2, at 1173 (same) with Sargent, supra note 6, at 729-30 (statutes are
constitutional) and Note, The Constitutionality of State Takeover Statutes: A Re-
sponse to Great Western, 53 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 872, 877-78 (1978) (same) [hereinafter
cited as A Response to Great Western].
12. 102 S. Ct. 2629 (1982). The Court first held that the case was not moot
because the Illinois Secretary of State indicated that he intended to enforce the
penalties provided in the challenged statute against MITE and therefore a reversal of
the lower court's decision would expose MITE to civil and criminal liability. Id. at
2635 (White, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Blackmun, Stevens & O'Connor, JJ.). Three
Justices dissented on the mootness issue. Id. at 2648 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined
by Brennan, J.); id. at 2652 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Powell agreed that the
case was moot, but concurred in the judgment. Id. at 2643 (Powell, J., concurring).
As a result, only six Justices reached the merits of the case.
13. Id. at 2641-43 (White, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Powell, Stevens & O'Con-
nor, JJ.). Justice Blackmun did not join this part of the Court's opinion. Id. at 2633.
14. See id. at 2635-40 (White, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Blackmun, J.) (statute
preempted); id. at 2643 (Powell, J., concurring) (statute not necessarily preempted);
id. at 2647-48 (Stevens, J., concurring) (same). Justice O'Connor did not reach the
preemption issue. Id. at 2643 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See infra notes 146-49 and
accompanying text. The Seventh Circuit held that the statute violated the commerce
clause and was preempted by the Williams Act. MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486,
502-03 (7th Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629 (1982).
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The effect of the MITE decision on state insurance legislation regu-
lating tender offers is unclear. 15 Before MITE, some courts had struck
down state regulation of tender offers for insurance companies, rea-
soning that the legislation was subject to the same constitutional
infirmities as general state takeover legislation. 16
This Note contends that state regulation of tender offers for insur-
ance companies is a permissible exercise of the states' traditional
power to regulate the insurance industry. Part I surveys the state and
federal regulatory schemes currently in place. Parts II and III analyze
the commerce clause and preemption challenges to state insurance
takeover legislation.
I. THE REGULATORY SCHEME
A. Federal Statutes
1. The McCarran-Ferguson Act
Since 1868, when the Supreme Court held that the issuance of an
insurance policy is not a transaction in commerce and therefore not
subject to federal regulation under the commerce clause,' 7 insurance
companies' activities have been subject to state regulation., 8 In 1944,
15. The effect of the decision on general state takeover legislation is also unclear.
Since the MITE decision, the trend has been for courts to hold that general state
takeover statutes are unconstitutional. Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d 576, 581-
82 (4th Cir. 1983) (statute violates commerce clause; preemption issue not ad-
dressed); Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558, 565-68 (6th Cir.
1982) (same); National City Lines v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122, 1134-35 (8th Cir.
1982) (statute violates commerce clause and is preempted by Williams Act); Bendix
Corp. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 547 F. Supp. 522, 532 (D. Md. 1982) (same);
Esmark, Inc. v. Strode, 639 S.W.2d 768, 773-74 (Ky. 1982) (statute violates com-
merce clause; preemption issue not addressed). But see Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. v.
Connolly, 686 F.2d 1029, 1035-40 (1st Cir. 1982) (Massachusetts takeover statute not
preempted; case remanded for determination of commerce clause claim). Ohio has
recently enacted general state takeover legislation regulating takeovers for targets
incorporated in Ohio. 1983 Ohio Legis. Bull. 1-25 (Anderson). The legislation was
designed to overcome the constitutional infirmities noted in MITE. See Vilkin,
Tender Offer War Heats Up Again, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 13, 1982, at 3, col. 1.
16. Gunter v. AGO Int'l B.V., 533 F. Supp. 86, 90 (N.D. Fla. 1981) (Florida
insurance takeover statute preempted by the Williams Act); National City Lines v.
LLC Corp., 524 F. Supp. 906, 911-12 (W.D. Mo. 1981) (Missouri insurance takeover
statute violates the commerce clause and is preempted by the Williams Act), aff'd,
687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982). But see John Alden Life Ins. Co. v. Woods, [1982
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,617, at 93,065-66 (D. Idaho Dec. 19,
1981) (Idaho insurance takeover statute does not violate the commerce clause and is
not preempted); Sun Life Group, Inc. v. Standard Life Ins. Co., [1979-1980 Transfer
Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,314, at 97,118 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 12, 1980)
(Indiana insurance takeover statute not preempted).
17. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 183 (1868).
18. See SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 458 (1969); Gerber, Govern-
mental Regulation of Insurance, in Property and Liability Insurance Handbook 985-
[Vol. 51
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however, the Court held that an insurance company conducting a
substantial part of its business across state lines was engaged in inter-
state commerce and therefore subject to federal regulation under the
Sherman Act.19 Congress responded by passing the McCarran-
Ferguson Act,20 which provides in part:
The business of insurance . . . shall be subject to the laws of the
several States .... No Act of Congress shall be construed to invali-
date, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the
purpose of regulating the business of insurance ... unless such Act
specifically relates to the business of insurance .... 21
Although the legislative history of the McCarran-Ferguson Act indi-
cates that Congress was concerned primarily with the amenability of
insurance companies to federal antitrust regulation,2 2 it also reveals
Congress' express intent not to interfere with state regulation of the
insurance business. 23 The statute, however, does not define the "busi-
ness of insurance" nor does the legislative history provide any guid-
ance.
2 4
Traditionally, the business of insurance has been considered the
relationship between the insurance company and the policyholder. 25
The Supreme Court has held, however, that the regulation of the
insurance company/shareholder relationship is governed by securities
regulations and thus not within the purview of the McCarran-Fergu-
86 (J. Long & D. Gregg eds. 1965); Comment, The National Securities Case: The
Supreme Court and Rule 10b-5, 69 Colum. L. Rev. 906, 907 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as The National Securities Case].
19. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 539, 553
(1944).
20. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1976). The legislative history of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act indicates that Congress was aware of uncertainty about the constitu-
tionality of state regulation of insurance after the decision in United States v. South-
Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). H.R. Rep. No. 143, 79th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2, reprinted in 1945 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 670, 671. Therefore, the purpose of
the Act was to ensure the continued regulation of the business of insurance by the
states. Id. at 3, reprinted in 1945 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. at 672.
21. 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1976).
22. H.R. Rep. No. 143, 79th Cong., Ist Sess. 2-3, reprinted in 1945 U.S. Code
Cong. Serv. 670, 671-72.
23. Id. at 2, reprinted in 1945 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. at 671; see SEC v. National
See., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 459 (1969).
24. SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 459-60 (1969); see Note, Federal
Regulation of Insurance Companies: The Disappearing McCarran Act Exemption,
1973 Duke L.J. 1340, 1345 [hereinafter cited as The Disappearing McCarran Act
Exemption].
25. SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 459-60 (1969); accord American
Gen. Ins. Co. v. FTC, 359 F. Supp. 887, 896 (S.D. Tex.), aff'd, 496 F.2d 197 (5th
Cir. 1974); 19 J. Appleman & J. Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 10,321, at
10 (1982); see 2 R. Anderson, Couch on Insurance § 21:1 (2d ed. 1959).
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son Act exemption.2 6 Thus, state regulation of insurance company
securities is permissible only if not preempted by federal securities
laws.
27
2. The Williams Act
The Williams Act 8 regulates cash tender offers and exchange offers
for equity securities of publicly traded companies. 29 Congress recog-
nized that tender offers are an efficient means for the acquisition of
corporate control, and therefore did not intend to hinder such offers.30
Rather, Congress sought to protect investors by providing them with
sufficient information to make informed decisions about the offer
within the short time periods in which takeovers are consummated. 31
The Williams Act is a disclosure statute with certain substantive
provisions. 32 A disclosure statement must be filed upon rapid accumu-
lation of a company's equity securities, which normally occurs prior to
a takeover bid.33 When an offer is made to the shareholders, an
26. SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 460-61 (1969); see The National
Securities Case, supra note 18, at 909; The Disappearing McCarran Act Exemption,
supra note 24, at 1347-48.
27. SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 461 (1969).
28. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); see 6 L. Loss,
supra note 3, at 3658.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1976). For a comprehensive discussion of the Williams
Act provisions, see Brown, The Scope of the Williams Act and its 1970 Amendments,
26 Bus. Law. 1637 (1971); Fogelson, Wenig & Friedman, Changing the Takeover
Game: The Securities and Exchange Commission's Proposed Amendments to the
Williams Act, 17 Harv. J. on Legis. 409, 412-21 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Fogelson].
30. See House Report, supra note 2, at 4, reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 2813-14; Senate Report, supra note 5, at 3-4.
31. House Report, supra note 2, at 2-3, reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 2812-13; Senate Report, supra note 5, at 3.
32. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); see House
Report, supra note 2, at 7-11, reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at
2817-21. See supra note 29.
33. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Any person who acquires
beneficial ownership of more than five percent of any class of publicly traded equity
securities must file an informational statement with the Securities and Exchange
Commission and send a copy to the issuer of the security and to the exchange where
the security is traded. Id. The disclosures are made on a Schedule 13D. 17 C.F.R. §
240.13d-l(a) (1982). The required information includes disclosure of the acquirer's
identity, the source and amount of funds used to make the acquisition, the purpose of
the acquisition, the number of shares already beneficially owned and any contracts
or arrangements in existence with respect to any securities of the issuer. 15 U.S.C. §
78m(d)(1)(A)-(E) (1976). A "beneficial owner" is "any person who, directly or
indirectly, through any contract, arrangement, understanding, relationship, or oth-
erwise has or shares: (1) [v]oting power which includes the power to vote, or to direct
the voting of, such security; and/or, (2) [i]nvestment power which includes the power
to dispose, or to direct the disposition of, such security." 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3(a)
(1982); see id. § 240.14d-l(b)(4).
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informational statement must be filed with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) and sent to the target company. 34 If the
amount of the offer is increased before the offer expires, the increased
consideration must be paid for all shares "taken up."' 35 Offerors must
purchase tendered shares on a pro-rata basis, 36 and shareholders have
limited withdrawal rights. 37 The statute contains a broad proscription
of fraud.3
8
The substantive provisions of the Williams Act have been criticized
as inadequate. 31 In 1979, the SEC promulgated new rules designed to
meet these criticisms. 40 The new rules extend shareholders' with-
34. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1976). This section regulates any tender offer for any
class of equity security that must be registered under § 12 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, id. § 781, or that is exempt from registration under § 12(g)(2)(G) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, id. § 781(g) (2) (G) (exempts securities issued by a
state-regulated insurance company), if after consummation of the offer, the offeror
would be the beneficial owner of more than five percent of that class. Id. § 78n(d)(1).
The offeror must disclose the information required by Schedule 13D, see supra note
33, as well as the following information required by Schedule 14D: 1) the back-
ground and identity of the target; 2) the background and identity of the offeror; 3)
past contacts, transactions or negotiations between the offeror and the target; 4) the
source and amount of funds or other consideration to be used for the acquisition; 5)
the purpose of the tender offer and plans or proposals of the offeror including
merger, reorganization or liquidation of the target or sale of assets of the target or
change in the management, capitalization or dividend policy of the target; 6) the
amount of shares of the target already beneficially owned, see supra note 33; 7) any
contracts or arrangements in existence with respect to any securities of the target; 8)
arrangements with persons retained by the offeror to make solicitations or recom-
mendations in connection with the offer; 9) current financial information about the
offeror; and 10) any additional information necessary. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100
(1982).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1976).
36. Id. § 78n(d) (6). When an offer is made for less than all the outstanding shares
of the class and a greater number of shares is tendered within ten days after the offer
is first made or within ten days after notice of any increase in the consideration
offered, the offeror must take up the shares on a pro-rata basis according to the
number of shares tendered by each shareholder. Id.
37. Id. § 78n(d)(5). Shareholders may withdraw shares tendered during the first
seven days of the offer or, if not already purchased, at any time after 60 days from
the date of the original offer. See id.; House Report, supra note 2, at 10, reprinted in
1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2820.
38. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976). The anti-fraud provision proscribes false or mis-
leading statements and fraudulent or manipulative acts by the offeror, target man-
agement or any other person in connection with the offer. Id.; see 17 C.F.R §§
240.14e-1 to -3 (1982).
39. State Takeover Statutes and the Williams Act (A Report of the Subcommittee
on Proxy Solicitations and Tender Offers of the Federal Regulation of Securities
Committee), 32 Bus. Law. 187, 189 (1976); see E. Aranow, H. Einhorn & G.
Berlstein, Developments in Tender Offers for Corporate Control xix (1977); Ship-
man, Some Thoughts About the Role of State Takeover Legislation: The Ohio
Takeover Act, 21 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 722, 722-23 (1970).
40. Regulation 14D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-1 to -101 (1982) (effective Jan. 7,
1980); Regulation 14E, id. §§ 240.14e-1, -2 (same); see Note, The Effect of the New
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drawa141 and proration rights42 and establish a minimum period dur-
ing which the offer must be kept open. 43 In addition, Rule 14d-2
requires that an offer be commenced or abandoned within five days
after it is publicly announced. 44
B. State Regulation of Tender Offers for Insurance Companies
In the 1960's, insurance companies became increasingly popular
targets of takeover bids by large conglomerates seeking to use insur-
ance companies' large reservoirs of liquid assets to finance their con-
tinued growth in non-insurance areas. 45 In 1969, the National Associa-
tion of Insurance Commissioners adopted the Insurance Holding
Company System Regulatory Act (Model Act) 46 to address the per-
ceived abuses and potential harm to shareholders and policyholders in
takeovers of insurance companies. 47 The Model Act has been adopted
in some form by almost all states48 and is used for the purpose of
analysis in this Note.
The Model Act requires the approval of the state insurance commis-
sioner before any person may acquire control of a domestic insurer. 49
The acquiring person must file a detailed disclosure statement with
SEC Rules on the Constitutionality of State Takeover Statutes, 8 Fordham Urb. L.J.
913, 913 (1980) [hereinafter cited as New SEC Rules]. The SEC has also proposed
amendments to the Williams Act to correct certain perceived deficiencies. Proposed
Bill to Amend Williams Act, reprinted in Legislative Proposals on Tender Offers,
Beneficial Ownership, Issuer Repurchases, See. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 542 Spec.
Supp. at 20 (Feb. 27, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Bill]; see Fogelson, supra
note 29, passim. Congress has not acted on these proposals.
41. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7 (1982). In addition to the statutory withdrawal right
period, see supra note 37, shareholders may withdraw tendered securities during the
first 15 business days after commencement of the offer, and if not already taken up,
during the ten business days following the commencement of a competing offer. 17
c.F.R. § 240.14d-7(a) (1982).
42. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8 (1982). An offeror may extend the statutory proration
period. Id. See supra note 36.
43. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1(a) (1982) (offers must be held open for at least 20
business days from the date first made).
44. Id. § 240.14d-2(b).
45. Kennedy, State Insurance Commissioner Involvement in Takeovers of Insur-
ers: An Overview of Procedures and Some Constitutional Considerations, 17 Forum
374, 375 & n.10 (1981); Note, The Insurance Holding Company Phenomenon and
the Search for Regulatory Controls, 56 Va. L. Rev. 636, 641-42, 644 (1970) [herein-
after cited as The Search for Regulatory Controls]; see Wilder, supra note 8, at 718.
46. Model Act, supra note 7, at 440-1 to 440-19.
47. See Kennedy, supra note 45, at 375-76; The Search for Regulatory Controls,
supra note 45, at 648-49.
48. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
49. Model Act, supra note 7, § 3(d), at 440-6 to 440-7. "Control [is] presumed to
exist if any person, directly or indirectly, owns, controls, holds with the power to
vote, or holds proxies representing, ten percent or more of the voting securities of any
other person." Id. § 1(c), at 440-1. "Person" is defined as "an individual, a corpora-
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the insurance commissioner and simultaneously provide a copy to the
target company management.50 A public hearing to determine
whether the acquisition will be approved must be held after the
offeror's statement is filed. 51 The Model Act authorizes the commis-
sioner to disapprove the acquisition if it would be detrimental to the
state's insurance industry52 or to the interests of either the policy-
holders53 or the shareholders. 54 Tender offers for insurance companies
may also be regulated by general state takeover statutes. 55 The consti-
tutionality of these statutes as applied to insurance companies is not
addressed in this Note.
tion, a partnership, an association, a joint stock company, a trust, an unincorporated
organization, [or) any similar entity." Id. § 1(f), at 440-2. "Domestic insurer" is not
defined in the Model Act. However, in all states a domestic insurer is any insurer
incorporated or organized under the laws of that state. E.g., N.Y. Ins. Law § 4(15)
(McKinney 1966); S.C. Code Ann. § 38-1-20(5) (Law. Co-op. 1977); S.D. Codified
Laws Ann. § 58-1-2(6) (Supp. 1982). The Model Act also provides that "for the
purposes of [section 3] a domestic insurer shall include any other person controlling a
domestic insurer unless such other person is either directly or through its affiliates
primarily engaged in business other than the business of insurance." Model Act,
supra note 7, § 3(a)(1), at 440-4.
50. Model Act, supra note 7, § 3(a)-(b), at 440-4 to 440-6. The required disclo-
sures are: 1) the background of the offeror; 2) the source and amount of funds used
to make the acquisition; 3) audited financial information of the acquiring party for
each of the preceding five years; 4) plans of the acquiring party to liquidate the
insurer, sell its assets, or change its business, corporate structure or management; 5)
the number of shares sought and the terms of the offer; 6) the number of shares
already beneficially owned; 7) a description of any contracts or arrangements in
existence with respect to any securities of the issuer; 8) a description of shares of the
target purchased by the offeror within the preceding twelve months; 9) a description
of recommendations made by the offeror to purchase the target's securities within the
preceding twelve months; 10) copies of the tender offer and related solicitation
materials; 11) the terms of the broker-dealer arrangements with respect to the offer;
and 12) any other information that the commissioner may prescribe as necessary for
the protection of the policyholders and shareholders of the target or in the public
interest. Id. § 3(b)(i)-(12), at 440-4 to 440-6.
51. Model Act, supra note 7, § 3(d)(2), at 440-7. The hearing must be held within
30 days after the disclosure statement is filed; a determination must be made within
30 days after the conclusion of the hearing. Id. There is no time limit on the duration
of the hearing. See id.
52. Id. § 3(d)(1)(i)-(ii), at 440-6.
53. See infra notes 156-61 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 36-456 to -468 (West 1981 & Supp.
1982); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 110C, § 1-13 (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982); Pa.
Stat. Ann. tit. 70, §§ 71-85 (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983). Only takeover bids for
domestic insurers are regulated by a state's version of the Model Act. See supra note
49 and accompanying text. General state takeover statutes may provide for regula-
tion of a bid for a foreign insurer. The jurisdictional provisions of such statutes
generally extend to tender offers for companies incorporated in the state or with
substantial assets in the state or with its principal place of business or principal
executive offices within the state. E.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 36-457(a) (West
1981 & Supp. 1982); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 49:5-2(m) (West Supp. 1982-1983); N.Y. Bus.
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Insurance takeover statutes are potentially in conflict with the fed-
eral regulatory scheme because the regulation of insurance company
securities transactions is governed by federal securities law.5 6 If the
statutes unduly burden interstate commerce or substantially interfere
with the federal scheme of takeover regulation, they will not survive a
constitutional challenge.
II. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE CHALLENGE
The commerce clause grant of power to Congress "[t]o regulate
Commerce. . .among the several States"57 does not preclude all state
regulation of commerce. 58 However, states may not regulate a subject
matter requiring a uniform national rule. 59 Furthermore, a regulation
that discriminates against interstate commerce 60 or protects local eco-
nomic interests is impermissible.6 1 If these prerequisites are met, the
Corp. Law § 1601(a) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983). Thus, a bid for an insurance
company may be subject to a state's version of the Model Act as well as other states'
general takeover statutes.
While the individual general takeover statutes vary, many of their provisions are
essentially the same. The statutes require notice to the state securities commissioner
and a waiting period after the notice before the offer may commence. E.g., Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 11-51.5-104(1) (Supp. 1982); Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 203(a)(1) (Supp.
1980); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 417E-3(D (1976). Most statutes exempt offers acceptable
to management. E.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 14-6-1(9)(B)(ii) (1982 & Supp. 1982); Ky.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 292.560(1)(c) (Bobbs-Merrill 1981); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 49:5-
2(1)(2)(e) (West Supp. 1982-1983). In some states, the state securities commissioner
may stop the offer based on his evaluation of its fairness to shareholders. E.g., Me.
Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 804(1)(B)(2) (Supp. 1982-1983); Minn. Stat. Ann. §
80B.03(5) (West Supp. 1983); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 552.05(5) (West Spec. Pamph.
1982). Failure to comply with the statute may result in an injunction or criminal
penalties. E.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 67-1264.8, .10 (1980); Minn. Stat. Ann. §§
80B.09-.10 (West Supp. 1983); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 70, §§ 81-82 (Purdon Supp. 1982-
1983).
56. Wilder, supra note 8, passim; see SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453,
459-60 (1969); 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1976).
57. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
58. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 140
(1973); H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 553 (1949) (Black, J., dissent-
ing); see L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law §§ 6-2 to -5 (1978).
59. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945); Wabash, St. L.
& Pac. Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 577 (1886); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53
U.S. 318, 339, 12 How. 299, 318 (1851); L. Tribe, supra note 58, § 6-4.
60. E.g., Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350-51
(1977); Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 329 (1977); Great
Ad. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 381 (1976).
61. E.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623-24 (1978); Hunt
v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 352-53 (1977); H.P. Hood
& Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 530-31 (1949); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc.,
294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935); see L. Tribe, supra note 58, at §§ 6-6 to -7.
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nature and importance of the state interest must be weighed against
the nature and extent of the burden it places on interstate commerce. 62
In Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. ,63 the Supreme Court set forth the
balancing test to be used:
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate
local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local bene-
fits.6 4
In Edgar v. MITE Corp.,65 the Supreme Court struck down the
general Illinois takeover statute 66 as unconstitutional under the Pike
test. 67 The Court objected to the Illinois Act's "nationwide reach
which purport[ed] to give Illinois the power to determine whether a
tender offer may proceed anywhere. ' 6 Although the effect the MITE
decision will have on the validity of state insurance takeover statutes is
unclear, the analysis used by the Court provides guidance for the
examination of the validity of the Model Act provisions.
A. Need for a Uniform National Rule
A strong argument can be made that in light of the national charac-
ter of the securities market, securities regulation demands a uniform
national rule. 9 The securities field, however, has traditionally been
subject to cooperative federal and state regulation.7 0 The need for a
62. Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 441 (1978); Great Afd.
& Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 371-72 (1976); Southern Pac. Co. v.
Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1945); see L. Tribe, supra note 58, § 6-5, at 326.
63. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
64. Id. at 142. The regulation is also not permitted "if reasonable nondiscrimina-
tory alternatives, adequate to conserve legitimate local interests, are available."
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951); see L. Tribe, supra note
58, § 6-12, at 341-42. The basic provisions of the Model Act-requirements of notice
to and approval by the state insurance commissioner-appear necessary for the
protection of policyholders. Determination whether a lesser amount of disclosure
could adequately meet the needs of the commissioner is beyond the scope of this
Note.
65. 102 S. Ct. 2629 (1982).
66. Illinois Business Take-Over Act §§ 1-20, Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 1211/, §§ 137.51-
.70 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-1983).
67. 102 S. Ct. at 2641 (White, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Powell, Stevens &
O'Connor, JJ.).
68. Id. at 2642 (White, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Powell, Stevens & O'Connor,
JJ.).
69. See Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83
Yale L.J. 663, 696-700 (1974); A Response to Great Western, supra note 11, at 920;
Commerce Clause Limitations, supra note 2, at 1165-66.
70. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478-79 (1977); Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66, 84-85 (1975); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414
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uniform national rule in the insurance industry is even less compelling
due to the states' responsibility to protect policyholders. 71
B. Protectionist Economic Legislation
States may not protect local economic interests by limiting access of
out-of-state sellers to local markets. 72 State takeover legislation seeking
to protect incumbent management from out-of-state bidders is argua-
bly impermissible.7 3 The approval requirement of state takeover stat-
utes may favor target management by decreasing the chance of a
successful takeover.7 4 Many courts, including the MITE Court, 75 have
viewed general takeover statutes that exempt tender offers acceptable
to management 76 -"friendly offers"-as evidence of such protection-
ist regulation. 77 Although the presence of such an exemption has not
been determinative, it may cast doubt on the state's asserted purpose
U.S. 117, 138 (1973); SEC v. National See., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 461 (1969); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1976), amended by Act of Oct.
13, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-303, § 4, 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News (96 Stat.)
1409.
71. This responsibility stems from the grant of power in the McCarran-Ferguson
Act, which mandates that the states shall regulate the insurance company/policy-
holder relationship. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
72. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623-24 (1978); H.P. Hood
& Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 532-33 (1949); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc.,
294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935); see L. Tribe, supra note 58, § 6-6, at 328.
73. See Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1282 (5th Cir. 1978),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173
(1979); Aranow & Einhorn, State Securities Regulation of Tender Offers, 46 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 767, 768-69 (1971); Wilner & Landy, supra note 11, at 18; Commerce
Clause Limitations, supra note 2, at 1159.
74. MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 494-95 (7th Cir. 1981), aff'd sub nom.
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629 (1982); Crane Co. v. Lam, 509 F. Supp. 782,
788 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 507 F. Supp. 1206, 1220-21 (D.N.J.
1981).
75. Model Act, supra note 7, § 3(a), at 440-4.
76. The Illinois statute challenged in MITE exempted a corporation's acquisition
of its own shares. Illinois Business Take-Over Act, § 2.09(4), Ill. Ann. Stat. ch.
1211/2, § 137.52-9(4) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-1983); see Edgar v. MITE Corp., 102
S. Ct. 2629, 2634 & n.4 (1982). In MITE, the target's management sought to defeat
the takeover attempt by making a competing tender offer for its own shares. Id. Most
state statutes with a "friendly offer" exemption exclude all offers acceptable to
management from coverage. See supra note 55.
77. See, e.g., Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1278 (5th Cir.
1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S.
173 (1979); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Marley, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed.
See. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,246, at 91,620-21 (W.D. Okla. July 17, 1981); see Edgar v.
MITE Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629, 2642 (1982) (White, J., joined by Burger, C.J.,
Powell, Stevens & O'Connor, JJ.). This analysis implicitly assumes that target man-
agement is normally more hostile to takeover bids by out-of-state offerors. See
Commerce Clause Limitations, supra note 2, at 1157-59.
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of shareholder protection. Under the Model Act, however, all forms
of acquisition of control-including "friendly" acquisitions- are regu-
lated and subject to the insurance commissioner's approval.7 9
Furthermore, although the Model Act may confer incidental bene-
fits upon local interests, its purpose is not to reduce competition by
limiting the access of out-of-state insurers to the market. 80 To the
contrary, a specific ground for disapproval of any offer is that the
acquisition would tend to have an anti-competitive effect on the
insurance industry in the state.
8 1
Thus, state insurance takeover legislation as provided in the Model
Act should prevail against a challenge that it constitutes protectionist
economic legislation. It must still be established, however, that the
state interests protected are legitimate, and that the legislation does
not unduly burden interstate commerce. 82
C. Balancing Test
1. State Interest
A state has a legitimate interest in regulating the internal affairs of a
corporation organized under its laws. 83 State corporate law protects
investors by regulating certain techniques used to effect change in the
corporate structure, such as the transfer and voting of shares, mergers,
78. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629, 2642 (1982) (White, J., joined by
Burger, C.J., Powell, Stevens & O'Connor, JJ.); Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell,
577 F.2d 1256, 1278 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great
W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979). But see AMCA Int'l Corp. v. Krouse, 482 F.
Supp. 929, 938 (S.D. Ohio 1979) (friendly offer exemption is merely an efficient
allocation of limited state resources).
79. See Model Act, supra note 7, § 3(a), at 440-4. The Model Act does exclude
tender offers or other acquisitions by the issuer of its own stock. Id. However,
retention of control by the issuer through the acquisition of its own stock is regulated
and subject to the insurance commissioner's approval under most state insurance
statutes. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 38-34 (1981); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art.
21.49-1 § 5(h) (Vernon 1981). State insurance takeover regulation should include
regulation of tender offers made by the issuer for the purpose of retaining control.
80. The purpose of the Model Act is to protect policyholders and shareholders of
domestic insurers, as indicated by the disclosure requirements and grounds for disap-
proval. Model Act, supra note 7, § 3(b)(12), (d)(1), at 440-6 to 440-7; see John Alden
Life Ins. Co. v. Woods, [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,617, at
93,064-65 (D. Idaho Dec. 19, 1981); Idaho Code § 41-3801A (Supp. 1982).
81. Model Act, supra note 7, § 3(d)(1)(ii), at 440-6.
82. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
83. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975); AMCA Int'l Corp. v. Krouse, 482 F.
Supp. 929, 939 (S.D. Ohio 1979); City Investing Co. v. Simcox, 476 F. Supp. 112,
116 (S.D. Ind. 1979), aff'd, 633 F.2d 56 (7th Cir. 1980); see Sargent, supra note 6, at
725; Shipman, supra note 39, at 741-45; A Response to Great Western, supra note 11,
at 922 & n.374.
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dissolutions and proxies, 4 Because the tender offer is a means of
effecting change in the corporate structure, the state arguably has a
legitimate interest under the internal affairs doctrine in regulating the
offer.85 Some courts, including the MITE Court, however, have not
been persuaded by this analysis. 86
In MITE, the internal affairs analysis did not lend support to the
validity of the Illinois statute because the statute permitted regulation
of tender offers for companies not incorporated in Illinois. 87 The
jurisdiction of the Model Act, however, is limited to domestic com-
panies,88 and thus the Act does not regulate the affairs of foreign
insurers. The MITE Court also stated that the internal affairs analysis
was irrelevant because "[t]ender offers contemplate transfers. . . to a
third party and do not themselves implicate the internal affairs of the
target company." 89
The acquisition of an insurance company, however, does have
internal affairs implications because it affects the interests of the
policyholder. Unlike the shareholder, who by tendering his shares
terminates his relationship with the target company, the policyholder
has a continuing, long-term interest in the remaining company. Insur-
ance takeover regulation seeks to protect this interest by assuring the
continued solidity and solvency of insurers; 9 0 any change in the con-
trol and management of an insurance company may affect its solvency
and therefore its ability to pay future policyholder claims. Moreover,
while shareholders tendering their shares in a takeover bid are pro-
tected by the provisions of the Williams Act, 91 policyholders receive no
84. See Sargent, supra note 6, at 724; Shipman, supra note 39, at 741-45; see,
e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §§ 201-202, 212, 215, 217, 219, 251-262 (1974 & Supp.
1980); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law §§ 609, 620, 622, 901-910 (McKinney 1963 & Supp.
1982-1983).
85. AMCA Int'l Corp. v. Krouse, 482 F. Supp. 929, 939 (S.D. Ohio 1979); see
City Investing Co. v. Simcox, 476 F. Supp. 112, 116 (S.D. Ind. 1979), aff'd, 633 F.2d
56 (7th Cir. 1980).
86. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629, 2642-43 (1982) (White, J., joined by
Burger, C.J., Powell, Stevens & O'Connor, JJ.); Crane Co. v. Lam, 509 F. Supp.
782, 789 (E.D. Pa. 1981); see Hi-Shear Indus. v. Campbell, [1981 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,804, at 90,033 (D.S.C. Dec. 4, 1980).
87. 102 S. Ct. at 2643 (White, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Powell, Stevens &
O'Connor, JJ.).
88. Model Act, supra note 7, § 3(a), at 440-4. See supra note 49 and accompany-
ing text.
89. 102 S. Ct. at 2643 (White, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Powell, Stevens &
O'Connor, JJ.).
90. See Model Act, supra note 7, § 3(b), (d), at 440-4 to 440-7; see also R.
Keeton, Basic Text on Insurance Law § 8.3, at 554 (1971).
91. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); see Piper v.
Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 35 (1977); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422
U.S. 49, 58 (1975); House Report, supra note 2, at 4, reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News at 2813-14.
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similar federal protection .92 Their only protection lies in the state's
power to regulate the insurance industry.93
The Model Act is also designed to protect shareholders.94 Although
protection of out-of-state investors is permissible, it may not be used to
justify state takeover legislation.95 The MITE Court stated, however,
that protection of resident investors is a legitimate state interest. 96
2. Burden on Interstate Commerce
The threshold of permissibility for state regulation under the com-
merce clause is that any burden on interstate commerce be "only
incidental"; direct regulation is not permissible. 97 A plurality of the
MITE Court concluded that the Illinois statute constituted direct
regulation of interstate commerce. 98 The conclusion was based on the
scope of the statute's jurisdictional provision,99 which covered tender
offers in which either ten percent of the target's shareholders were
Illinois residents or two of the following three conditions were met:
92. Federal regulation of tender offers provides solely for protection of investors.
See supra note 91.
93. Regulation of the policyholder/insurance company relationship has been the
responsibility of the states since the enactment of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. See
supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text. To avoid duplicative regulation of tender
offers for insurance companies, only one state should be allowed to assert jurisdiction
over an offer. Although all policyholders will not necessarily be residents of the state
in which the insurance company is incorporated, that state is in the best position to
protect policyholders' interests.
94. See Model Act, supra note 7, § 3(a), at 440-4. The Model Act requires that no
offer may be commenced until the shareholders have received a statement containing
the information required by the Act, thereby ensuring that shareholders have ade-
quate information with which to make a decision. Id. See supra notes 47, 50 and
accompanying text.
95. Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1283 (5th Cir. 1978),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173
(1979); Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 507 F. Supp. 1206, 1224 (D.N.J. 1981); see Edgar
v. MITE Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629, 2642 (1980) (White, J., joined by Burger, C.J.,
Powell, Stevens & O'Connor, JJ.).
96. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629, 2642 (White, J., joined by Burger,
C.J., Powell, Stevens & O'Connor, JJ.) (1982); accord Great W. United Corp. v.
Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1283 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy
v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979); Crane Co. v. Lam, 509 F. Supp.
782, 789 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
97. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629, 2640 (1982) (White, J., joined by
Burger, C.J., Stevens & O'Connor, JJ.) (emphasis omitted); Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
98. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629, 2640-41 (1982) (White, J., joined by
Burger, C.J., Stevens & O'Connor, JJ.).
99. Id. at 2641 (White, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Stevens & O'Connor, JJ.).
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the target had its principal executive office in Illinois, was organized
under the laws of Illinois, or had at least ten percent of its stated
capital and paid-in surplus in Illinois. 100 Therefore, the statute applied
regulates a tender offer for a target that had no shareholders residing
in Illinois and was not incorporated in Illinois.' 10
In contrast, the Model Act's regulation of takeover bids is limited to
domestic insurance companies. 0 2 Any burdens on interstate com-
merce are "only incidental." 103 These burdens may include the poten-
tial obstruction of the tender offer due to the approval requirement,
possible disruption in the trading and the orderly regulation of the
national securities market due to the delay necessitated by a hearing,
and the increased cost of a takeover attempt due to the disclosure and
hearing requirements. 104
The MITE Court was concerned primarily with the potential ob-
struction of a tender offer and the resultant nationwide "chilling
effect" on tender offers caused by the broad jurisdictional reach of the
Illinois statute. 10 5 This defect is not found in the Model Act, however;
its jurisdiction is limited to domestic insurance companies. 10 6
Although not addressed by the MITE Court, compliance with the
additional disclosure and hearing requirements of the Model Act may
substantially increase the cost of a takeover attempt, thereby deterring
tender offers. 0 7 Further, a hearing requirement may delay either the
commencement of a takeover bid, or if the offer commences subject to
the hearing requirement, the completion of an acquisition. Either
delay may disrupt trading in securities of both the offeror and the
target of a tender offer, 10 8 thereby placing a burden on the orderly
100. Illinois Business Take-Over Act § 2.10, Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 1211/2, § 137.52-10
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-1983).
101. 102 S. Ct. at 2641 (White, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Stevens & O'Connor,
JJ.).
102. Model Act, supra note 7, § 3(a), at 440-4. See supra note 49 and accompany-
ing text.
103. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
105. 102 S. Ct. at 2641-42 (White, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Powell, Stevens &
O'Connor, JJ.).
106. Model Act, supra note 7, § 3(a), at 440-4. See supra note 49 and accompany-
ing text.
107. Cf. Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1286 (5th Cir. 1978)
(burdensome disclosure requirements will discourage prospective offerors), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979). See
supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
108. Empire, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 524 F. Supp. 898, 904 (W.D. Mo. 1981); see
Wilner & Landy, supra note 11, at 23; Commerce Clause Limitations, supra note 2,
at 1151-52; cf. Dart Indus. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. 1, 10, 14 (S.D. Ind. 1978) (delay
created by compliance with provisions of Delaware general takeover statute creates
disruption in national securities market).
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regulation of the national securities market. Delay, however, can
have a positive effect; it may foster competition, which would make
the marketplace more efficient and bring an increased price to share-
holders. 109
3. Balance
The Model Act is "even-handed" because it applies to all techniques
for acquisition of control of a domestic insurance company.110 The
state has a strong, legitimate interest in such regulation"1 which far
exceeds that advanced by Illinois in the MITE case. The only legiti-
mate interest of Illinois to justify the legislation was the protection of
resident investors." 2 The MITE Court, while finding this interest
insufficient on the facts of the case," 3 recognized that there might be
circumstances in which state interests would be sufficient to justify
state takeover legislation." 4 By providing policyholders relief from
financial loss and the fear of loss, the insurance industry plays an
important role in the United States economy.",5 Therefore, the state
interest in protecting policyholders combined with its interest in the
protection of resident shareholders is substantial and should tip the
balance in favor of state insurance takeover regulation.
Because the Model Act regulates only tender offers for domestic
insurance companies," 6 its burdens on interstate commerce are sub-
stantially less onerous than those of the Illinois statute. Such burdens
are not "clearly excessive '117 in relation to the benefits accorded the
109. See Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1283-85 (5th Cir.
1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S.
173 (1979); A Response to Great Western, supra note 11, at 902 & n.213; Note,
Securities Law and the Constitution: State Tender Offer Statutes Reconsidered, 88
Yale L.J. 510, 524 (1979).
110. Model Act, supra note 7, § 3(a), at 440-4. See supra note 49 and accompany-
ing text.
111. See supra pt. I(A)(1).
112. See 102 S. Ct. at 2642 (White, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Powell, Stevens &
O'Connor, JJ.).
113. Id. at 2641-43 (White, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Powell, Stevens & O'Con-
nor, JJ.).
114. See id. at 2642 (White, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Powell, Stevens & O'Con-
nor, JJ.); id. at 2643 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 2648 (Stevens, J., concurring).
115. Loman, Insurance in Society, in Property and Liability Insurance Handbook
3 (J. Long & D. Gregg eds. 1965). Insurance is important to the individual policy-
holder because it provides relief from loss and fear of loss as well as facilitating
private finance of property such as homes and automobiles. Id. at 6-9. In the business
community, insurance may provide accuracy in prediction of production costs, relief
from financial loss and the facilitation of financing of capital assets. Id.
116. Model Act, supra note 7, § 3(a), at 440-4. See supra note 49 and accompany-
ing text.
117. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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resident shareholders and the otherwise unprotected policyholders.
Therefore, state regulation of tender offers for insurance companies in
accordance with the Model Act does not violate the commerce clause.
III. THE PREEMPTrION CHALLENGE
Even if state insurance takeover legislation is permissible under the
commerce clause, it may be preempted under the supremacy
clause."" Federal takeover legislation may have "occupied the
field,""19 thereby preempting all state legislation. Such occupation
may be indicated by express statutory language or the legislative
history of the statute, or may be implicit in the purpose and effect of
the statute.12 0
State legislation is also preempted if it conflicts with federal legisla-
tion.121 Direct conflict exists when simultaneous compliance with both
federal and state regulations is impossible. 122 Conflict is indirect
when, although compliance with both regulations is possible, compli-
ance with the state regulation frustrates the "purposes and objectives"
of the federal regulation. 2 3
Although the MITE majority did not hold that the Illinois statute
was preempted by the Williams Act,124 lower courts before and after
the MITE decision have struck down state takeover legislation on
preemption grounds. 2 5 Therefore, the provisions of the Model Act
must be analyzed carefully in relation to the objectives and provisions
of the Williams Act.
118. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; see L. Tribe, supra note 58, § 6-23.
119. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230-31 (1947); accord Penn-
sylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 504 (1956); see L. Tribe, supra note 58, § 6-25;
Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger
Court, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 623, 625 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Preemption Doc-
trine].
120. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977); see L. Tribe, supra note
58, § 6-25. If there is no express language of preemption in the statute, courts will
look for a pervasive scheme of federal regulation, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed
Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633 (1973); Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315
U.S. 148, 159-63 (1942), or a dominant federal interest in the subject matter of the
regulation, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 504-07 (1956) (national
security); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62-63 (1941) (foreign affairs).
121. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978); Jones v. Rath
Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525-26 (1977); see L. Tribe, supra note 58, § 6-24;
Preemption Doctrine, supra note 119, at 626 & n.20.
122. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43
(1963); L. Tribe, supra note 58, § 6-24, at 377-78.
123. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); see L. Tribe, supra note 58, § 6-
24, at 378-79.
124. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
125. For post-MITE decisions, see National City Lines v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d
1122 (8th Cir. 1982); Bendix Corp. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 547 F. Supp. 522 (D.
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A. Federal Occupation of the Field
Courts have consistently held that federal securities regulation does
not occupy the field. 2 6 The coexistence of federal securities laws and
state blue sky laws supports this finding. 12 7 Also, the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 contains a savings clause specifically permitting
some state regulation. 128 Further, the statutory language and legisla-
tive history of the Williams Act are devoid of any intent to occupy the
field. 12 The Williams Act is intended to be a minimum disclosure
statute, not a pervasive scheme of regulation. 130 Although the SEC has
requested Congress to amend the Williams Act to preempt all state
takeover legislation,' 3 ' Congress has not acted on this proposal.
B. Direct Conflict
Rule 14d-2 requires that an offer be commenced or abandoned
within five days after it is publicly announced. 132 Simultaneous com-
pliance with the Rule and state statutes requiring a waiting period of
Md. 1982). For pre-MITE decisions, see Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577
F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W.
United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979); Empire, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 524 F. Supp. 898
(W.D. Mo. 1981); Brascan, Ltd. v. Lassiter, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 98,247 (E.D. La. Apr. 30, 1979).
126. See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629, 2635 (1982) (White, J.,
joined by Burger, C.J., Blackmun, J.); Hi-Shear Indus. v. Campbell, [1981 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,804, at 90,030 (D.S.C. Dec. 4, 1980); Hi-
Shear Indus. v. Neiditz, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,805, at
90,036 (D. Conn. Dec. 3, 1980); AMCA Int'l Corp. v. Krouse, 482 F. Supp. 929,
934-35 (S.D. Ohio 1979).
127. See Sargent, supra note 6, at 704-05; A Response to Great Western, supra
note 11, at 909.
128. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1976),
amended by Act of Oct. 13, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-303, § 4, 1982 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News (96 Stat.) 1409.
129. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629, 2635 & n.6 (1982) (White, J.,
joined by Burger, C.J., Blackmun, J.); Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d
1256, 1275 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W.
United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979); Empire, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 524 F. Supp. 898, 903
(W.D. Mo. 1981); Natomas Co. v. Bryan, 512 F. Supp. 191, 192 (D. Nev. 1981).
130. See MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 491 (7th Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nom.
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629 (1982); AMCA Int'l Corp. v. Krouse, 482 F.
Supp. 929, 934-35 (S.D. Ohio 1979); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Marley, [1981-
1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,246, at 91,620 (W.D. Okla.
July 17, 1981).
131. Proposed Bill, supra note 40, at 23. The SEC stated that state takeover
statutes should be preempted because they are inconsistent with uniform, national
control of tender offers. Id. at 29; see Fogelson, supra note 29, at 440-51.
132. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b) (1982).
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more than five days is thus impossible. 33 Since the enactment of Rule
14d-2, courts have struck down general state takeover statutes on the
ground that a longer waiting period conflicts with the Rule. 3 4 The
Model Act imposes no waiting period requirement' 35 and thus creates
no readily apparent conflict with the Williams Act. The Model Act's
hearing requirement, however, may conflict with the Rule by delay-
ing the commencement of the offer more than five days. 36 The United
States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, reviewing
Indiana's insurance statute,137 which is virtually identical to the Model
Act, found no direct conflict with the Rule. 3  The court interpreted
the Indiana statute as permitting the offer to go forward provided it
was conditioned upon the subsequent approval of the insurance com-
missioner. ' 3 The Alabama insurance statute specifically provides for
this interpretation. 40 Because the Model Act may be construed as
allowing the offer to go forward in accordance with the Rule, direct
conflict should not be found.' 4 1 To avoid the possibility of preemp-
tion, however, all state insurance legislation should be amended to
133. See Bloomenthal, The New Tender Offer Regimen, State Regulation, and
Preemption, 30 Emory L.J. 35, 59-60 (1981); Pozen, Rule 14d-2(b) Under the '34 Act
and State Regulation of Takeover Bids, in Twelfth Annual Institute on Securities
Regulation 228 (PLI 1981); New SEC Rules, supra note 40, at 931-32. The SEC has
stated that adoption of the Rule has created a conflict with state waiting period
requirements "so direct and substantial as to make it impossible to comply with both
sets of requirements as they presently exist." SEC Rel. No. 34-16,384, [1979-1980
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,373, at 82,584 (Nov. 29, 1979).
134. E.g., Natomas Co. v. Bryan, 512 F. Supp. 191, 192-93 (D. Nev. 1981);
Canadian Pac. Enters. (U.S.) v. Krouse, 506 F. Supp. 1192, 1204 (S.D. Ohio 1981);
Eure v. Grand Metropolitan, Ltd., [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH)
97,694, at 98,648 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 18, 1980). The MITE Court did not
address the Rule 14d-2 issue. The offer in MITE was made in January of 1979. Edgar
v. MITE Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629, 2633 (1982). Rule 14d-2 was not effective until
January 7, 1980. See supra note 40.
135. See Model Act, supra note 7, § 3(a), at 440-4.
136. The hearing must be held within 30 days after the offeror files an informa-
tional statement with the insurance commissioner. At least 20 days notice must be
given to the offeror and seven days notice to the target company before the hearing
may be held. The commissioner must reach a decision within 30 days from the
conclusion of the hearing. Id. § 3(d)(2), at 440-7. No time limit is placed on the
duration of the hearing. See id.
137. Ind. Code Ann. §§ 27-1-23-2, -7 to -8, -12 (Burns Supp. 1982).
138. Sun Life Group, Inc. v. Standard Life Ins. Co., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder]
Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,314, at 97,117-18 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 12, 1980).
139. Id.
140. Ala. Code § 27-29-3(a)(2) (1975).
141. See SEC Rel. No. 34-16,623, See. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 544, at G-1
(Mar. 12, 1980). The SEC stated:
Nothing in the rules prohibits offers under the terms of which the accept-
ance for payment is conditioned upon fulfillment of a condition requiring
regulatory approval. The Commission recognized in Release No. 34-16,384
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permit an offer to proceed in conformity with Rule 14d-2, conditioned
upon the approval of the insurance commissioner.
C. Indirect Conflict
1. Investor Protection
It has been argued that the purpose of general state takeover stat-
utes is protection of target management, which conflicts with the
investor protection purpose of the Williams Act.142 Many courts have
found that the hearing provisions of state takeover statutes that delay
commencement of an offer protect target management by impeding
both the occurrence and progress of tender offers. 143 An approval
requirement may also deter takeover bids. 144 These provisions there-
fore arguably disrupt the balance between the offeror and target
management-"neutrality"-created by the Williams Act. 45
that regulatory approvals may be required before a bidder will be permitted
to actually purchase shares. The nature and extent of any such condition
must be fully described in the bidder's tender offer materials.
Id. Furthermore, there is a judicial preference to harmonize federal and state regula-
tion whenever possible and not to find the state statute preempted. See Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 127 (1973); New York
State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 423 n.29 (1973); Goldstein v.
California, 412 U.S. 546, 553-54 (1973).
142. See Moylan, State Regulation of Tender Offers, 58 Marq. L. Rev. 687, 690,
702 (1975); Commerce Clause Limitations, supra note 2, at 1169-70.
143. E.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629, 2638-39 (1982) (White, J.,
joined by Burger, C.J., Blackmun, J.); Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d
1256, 1278 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W.
United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979); Gunter v. AGO Int'l B.V., 533 F. Supp. 86, 89-
90 (N.D. Fla. 1981); see National City Lines v. LLC Corp., 524 F. Supp. 906, 910-11
(W.D. Mo. 1981), aff'd, 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982); Dart Indus. v. Conrad, 462
F. Supp. 1, 12-13 (S.D. Ind. 1978).
144. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
145. See House Report, supra note 2, at 4, reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 2813; Senate Report, supra note 5, at 3. The requirements of "neutral-
ity" under the Williams Act have been the subject of dispute. One approach is based
on the belief that "neutrality" is itself an objective of the Williams Act and that
Congress established the prerequisites for such "neutrality" when it formulated the
provisions of the Williams Act regulating tender offers. Therefore, state provisions
differing from those of the Williams Act that operate to upset the "neutrality"
envisioned by Congress are preempted. MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 495-99
(7th Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629 (1982); see
Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1279-80, (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979);
Wilner & Landy, supra note 11, at 25-29.
Alternatively, it has been argued that the sole purpose of the Williams Act is
investor protection. See AMCA Int'l Corp. v. Krouse, 482 F. Supp. 929, 936-37 (S.D.
Ohio 1979); Sargent, supra note 6, at 713; A Response to Great Western, supra note
11, at 913-15. Neutrality is merely the policy adopted to achieve this purpose. Piper
v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1977) (Tender offeror is not intended
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Of the five Justices addressing the preemption issue in MITE,148
three determined that the balance envisioned by the Williams Act
provisions is a major, inseparable aspect of investor protection, 47 and
any state takeover legislation that disrupts this balance would there-
fore conflict with the Williams Act. 148 The two remaining Justices,
however, stated that the Williams Act's neutrality policy does not
necessarily prohibit "state legislation designed to assure . . . greater
protection to interests that include but often are broader than those of
incumbent management."1 49
Even if the Williams Act does prohibit state regulation that pro-
vides additional protections to target management, the hearing and
approval requirements of the Model Act should not upset the balance
in takeover bids for insurance companies. Offers may go forward in
accordance with Rule 14d-2 provided they are conditioned on ap-
proval by the insurance commissioner. 1'0 However, a reasonable time
limit should be placed on the duration of the hearing to avoid any
unnecessary disruption in the securities market.'-" Furthermore, be-
cause approval is required for all forms of acquisition of control of a
domestic insurance company, 152 target management will not be able
to exclude from regulation offers that it finds acceptable.
2. The Market Approach
The provision of the Model Act that requires approval of a takeover
by the insurance commissioner arguably frustrates the objective of the
Williams Act of promoting informed decision-making by investors-
the "market approach." 153 Many courts have found that general state
beneficiary of Williams Act, and therefore does not have standing to sue.). The
provisions of the Williams Act do not constitute a statutory formula for "neutrality,"
and therefore, if the state provisions support the goal of investor protection, they will
not be preempted solely on the ground that they contain provisions different from the
Williams Act. See AMCA Int'l Corp. v. Krouse, 482 F. Supp. 929, 936-38 (S.D. Ohio
1979); Sargent, supra note 6, at 713; A Response to Great Western, supra note 11, at
913-15.
146. See supra note 14.
147. 102 S. Ct. at 2636-37 (White, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Blackmun, J.)
148. Id. at 2637 (White, J;, joined by Burger, C.J., Blackmun, J.).
149. Id. at 2643 (Powell, J., concurring); accord id. at 2648 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring).
150. See supra notes 136-41 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 136.
152. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
153. See Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1276 (5th Cir. 1978)
(general state takeover legislation), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great
W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979); Gunter v. AGO Int'l B.V., 533 F. Supp. 86,
90 (N.D. Fla. 1981) (insurance state takeover legislation); National City Lines v.
LLC Corp., 524 F. Supp. 906, 911 (W.D. Mo. 1981) (same), af'd, 687 F.2d 1122
(8th Cir. 1982); Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 507 F. Supp. 1206, 1217 (D.N.J. 1981)
(general state takeover legislation).
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takeover legislation requiring the state securities commissioner's ap-
proval conflicts with the market approach adopted by the Williams
Act by substituting the commissioner's decision for the investors' deci-
sions. 154
Unlike such provisions in general state takeover legislation, how-
ever, the approval requirement in the Model Act is designed primarily
to protect policyholders. 155 Most grounds for disapproval of an offer
relate to concerns about the financial solvency and stability of the
target after the takeover. The commissioner considers how the follow-
ing will affect the policyholders' interests: 1) the qualifications of the
remaining company to carry on the business of insurance; 156 2) the
financial stability of the offeror; 5 7 3) the plans of the offeror to
liquidate the target or sell its assets; 15 8 4) the plans of the offeror to
merge or consolidate the target or make any other change in its
corporate structure and control; 5 5) the competence, integrity and
experience of the offeror's management; 16 0 and 6) the effect of the
takeover on competition in the insurance industry in the state.','
These grounds do not constitute a substitution of the insurance com-
missioner's decision for the investor's decision, but rather a means to
protect otherwise defenseless policyholders. After the policyholders'
interests are safeguarded, the investor still decides whether to tender
his shares.
The Model Act also allows the insurance commissioner to disap-
prove a takeover if the terms of the offer are deemed unfair to the
target's shareholders 62 or if the financial stability of the offeror after
the takeover might jeopardize the interests of any remaining share-
holders.6 3 Because these grounds for disapproval frustrate the objec-
tive of Congress to allow the investor to make his own decision, 6 4 they
should not be included in any state insurance takeover legislation.
154. E.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629, 2639-40 (1982) (White, J.,
joined by Burger, C.J., Blackmun, J.); Gunter v. AGO Int'l B.V., 533 F. Supp. 86,
90 (N.D. Fla. 1981); National City Lines v. LLC Corp., 524 F. Supp. 906, 911
(W.D. Mo. 1981), aff'd, 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982); Kennecott Corp. v. Smith,
507 F. Supp. 1206, 1220 (D.N.J. 1981).
155. See Model Act, supra note 7, § 3(b)(12), (d)(1)(i)-(iii), (v)-(vi), at 440-6 to
440-7.
156. Id. § 3(d)(1)(i), at 440-6.
157. Id. § 3(d)(1)(iii), at 440-7.
158. Id. § 3(d)(1)(v), at 440-7.
159. Id.
160. Id. § 3(d)(1)(vi), at 440-7.
161. Id. § 3(d)(1)(ii), at 440-6.
162. Id. § 3(d)(1)(iv), at 440-7.
163. Id. § 3(d)(1)(iii), at 440-7.
164. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
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3. Disclosure
Some courts have found that additional disclosure requirements
impede Congress' objective of promoting informed decision-mak-
ing. 16 This argument is based on the principle that at some point,
disclosure is subject to diminishing returns and therefore additional
disclosure may confuse the average investor. 16 This analysis is faulty,
however, because it assumes that Congress has determined the proper
amount of disclosure required for informed decision-making. 1 7 The
Williams Act is a minimum disclosure statute168 and, as in other areas
of securities regulation, states may require additional disclosure.169
Furthermore, the additional disclosure requirements of the Model Act
are justifiable considering the special interest of the state in protecting
policyholders. 70 The additional disclosure is provided to the state
insurance commissioner, 17 ' who has the requisite expertise to interpret
it. Investors will therefore not be confused by the additional informa-
tion.
CONCLUSION
State regulation of takeover bids for insurance companies provides
protection for policyholders, who are not protected by the Williams
Act. As provided under the Model Act, such regulation does not
constitute a direct or impermissibly excessive burden on interstate
commerce. This regulation is not preempted by the Williams Act if
carefully drawn to permit an offer to go forward and be consum-
mated on a timely basis. The insurance commissioner's approval may
be required provided his decision is limited to policyholder protection
considerations. In addition to protecting the interests of policyholders,
shareholders are provided with additional protection they would not
have been afforded under the Williams Act.
Susan Webster
165. E.g., Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1278-79 (5th Cir.
1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S.
173 (1979); Dart Indus. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. 1, 13 (S.D. Ind. 1978); see Wilner
& Landy, supra note 11, at 25-26.
166. TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448-49 (1976); A Response to
Great Western, supra note 11, at 917; see Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577
F.2d 1256, 1280 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W.
United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979); E. Aranow, H. Einhorn, & G. Berlstein, supra
note 39, at 219-20.
167. See A Response to Great Western, supra note 11, at 917-19.
168. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
171. Model Act, supra note 7, § 3(a), at 440-4.
